This paper analyzes the dynamic relationship between entrepreneurs and investors. We detail how the nature of competition and criteria for continued financing affect entrepreneurial activity and success when both project quality and sources of cash flow, such as effort or costly internal financing, are private information. Up to a point, entrepreneurs who would not be refinanced without costly internal finance will now tap these sources of funds to obtain refinancing. With long-term contracts, or relationship banking, there is credit rationing: the marginally refinanced projects has a strictly positive NPV, but this credit rationing improves the average quality of refinanced projects, improving entrepreneurial welfare. In contrast, when lenders compete period-by-period, all positive expected NPV projects are funded, but in equilibrium, entrepreneurs supplement revenues only to obtain better financing terms, which is wasteful.
Introduction
Casual empiricism suggests that many businesses fail because firms cannot meet short-run liquidity needs. Entrepreneurs often claim that current cash flow problems are not indicative of long-run potential. Unfortunately, these entrepreneurs are unable to convince their lenders of their prospects; the lenders, seeing little cash flow, pull the plug. To forestall premature liquidation, entrepreneurs often devote tremendous personal resources to try to keep their ventures alive. Such entrepreneurs also use alternative sources of financing with high opportunity costs to generate cash to keep ventures afloat. Examples include the sale of personal goods or refinancing with personal collateral and sales of goods or the resources of the firm below their long-run value. These entrepreneurs risk "throwing good money after bad" trying to convince lenders to continue to finance them.
In traditional models of entrepreneurial finance, the standard financing contractual form, whether limited liability loan contracts or equity, induces entrepreneurs to under-invest or to exert too little effort from an efficiency standpoint. This is because entrepreneurs do not receive the entire marginal contribution of their efforts. For example, with limited liability, entrepreneurs only reap the rewards of their efforts when they can repay their loans. With equity, entrepreneurs only receive a fraction of the payoff of their efforts or investment. In both cases, the consequence is either under-investment or under-exertion. Myers (1977) was the first to consider these types of incentive effects of the contractual form on entrepreneurs.
In this paper, we show that introducing dynamic concerns in a model of financing with asymmetric information reverses standard results on entrepreneurial under-exertion. Entrepreneurs now have incentives to over-exert to convince lenders to continue funding. We analyze equilibrium financing contracts in two situations, first, when the borrower and lender can commit to long-term relationships, and second, when they cannot. In both cases, excessive effort results. However, when relationship banking is possible, this effort is beneficial because the average quality of projects that are refinanced is increased, while when long-term relationships are not possible, this effort is wasteful.
The equilibrium with long-term banking relationships features credit-rationing. That is, the marginal funded project has a strictly positive expected NPV. This credit rationing persists even when other banks can make offers to an entrepreneur when credit is denied. In contrast, with period-by-period competition by lenders, there is no credit rationing but excessive effort is wasteful because it does not improve the quality of refinanced projects.
Not surprisingly, entrepreneurs are better off ex ante when borrowers and lenders can establish long-term financing relationships. As is commonly the case, commitment in long-term contracts can raise welfare (see e.g. Hart and Tirole (1988) , or Rey and Salanie (1990) ). What is counterintuitive is that equilibrium outcomes under period-by-period competition can have several apparently optimal features that outcomes under enduring financing relationships do not. First, conditional on first-period revenues, all projects with positive expected net present values are refinanced. Next, second-period interest rates are lower for projects with higher first-period revenues. With enduring relationships, not only is there credit rationing, but also, there is a single second-period interest rate for all refinanced projects. Projects with higher expected net present values do not receive better refinancing terms.
The reason that credit rationing is beneficial with enduring financial relationships is that by denying refinancing to some projects with positive net present values, and offering low secondperiod interest rates, the lender differentially encourages high quality entrepreneurs to sort themselves out by expending effort to increase their first-period cash flows. This improves the expected quality of refinanced projects. Thus, with enduring relationships, seemingly excessive effort leads to more efficient refinancing decisions. In contrast, when there is competition between lenders period-by-period, entrepreneurs expend effort only to obtain better future funding terms. Since this does not affect the average quality of refinanced projects, this effort is wasteful.
The rationale for credit rationing in our enduring lending relationship environment is novel.
In most models, credit-rationing is driven by the limited-liability loan contract. Holding mean project payoff constant, entrepreneurs with riskier projects expect greater profits. Consequently, banks ration credit to avoid differentially selecting riskier firms (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) . In a dynamic context, Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) show how denying credit to defaulters can reduce an entrepreneur's incentive to take on unobserved excessive risk. Our model does not feature excessive risk. Rather, credit is rationed because even though lowering the standard for refinance would, on average, draw firms with positive expected net present value, it would be at the cost of excessive effort.
In our model, a lower standard for refinance would draw positive NPV firms because it differentially lures good entrepreneurs. However, it may not be profitable for anyone to refinance an entrepreneur who fails to meet the equilibrium refinancing standard. Even when the equilibrium contract requires commitment by the initial financier, other banks are unwilling to extend credit if they do not observe an entrepreneur's revenues. In contrast, in Weiss (1981), (1983) , or Besanko and Thakor (1987) , other banks would find it profitable to extend credit if they could.
In the enduring financing relationship in our model, the bank commits to refinance at a prespecified interest rate any entrepreneur who meets the initial revenue target. Duca and VanHoose (1990) note that 80% of all commercial bank lending features loan commitments. Udell (1987), (1991) , Boot and Thakor (1991) , Berkovitch and Greenbaum (1991) and Snyder (1998) show how loan commitments can help overcome under-investment or under-exertion problems induced by limited liability loan contracts. Banks commit to low, unprofitable, future interest rates so that entrepreneurs internalize moral hazard problems. In turn, banks are compensated with an up-front financing fee. Borrowers treat the up-front fee as sunk when making decisions, and since they receive most of the proceeds of their decisions, they make efficient decisions. Morgan (1993) presents a model with costly state verification in which the funds necessary to cover project costs are private information to the entrepreneur. To discourage the entrepreneur from claiming high costs and pocketing unused funds, the optimal contract features an up-front fee to cover expected default and a commitment to an interest rate that is increasing in the announced costs. Thakor (1989) and Thakor and Shockley (1997) present models with adverse selection where loan commitments can help sort entrepreneurs. None of these papers consider how loan commitments affect the selection of refinanced projects or how loan commitments can lead to effort levels that, when viewed in a static context, are excessive. These channels are the focus of our study.
An alternative interpretation of our model is of the internal capital budgeting process in a large firm. Our results suggest that it is optimal for screening purposes to commit to withholding funding from some positive NPV projects in the internal capital budgeting process.
There has been some work showing that with dynamic information asymmetry in the labor market, workers will undertake excessive effort from a social standpoint. In Holmström (1982) , managers have incentives to work excessively hard to convince the market that they are talented.
In Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor (1996) excessive effort arises because of adverse selection. These studies analyze period-by-period competition by firms for workers. In contrast, we compare outcomes under both period-by-period competition and commitment in a financial market.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents the model. Section 2 characterizes outcomes when lenders and entrepreneurs can establish enduring financing relationships. We then discuss the robustness of the results to various modeling assumptions. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium when lenders compete period-by-period. Section 4 provides a comparison of the commitment and no-commitment equilibria. Section 5 presents empirical implications, and Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
The Model
An entrepreneur at time t = 0 has a project of unknown quality that requires external funding of K = 1 in each of two periods to operate. 1 Financing is provided by competitive banks. We assume that all parties are risk neutral and we normalize the risk-free interest rate to zero.
For simplicity, we assume that all financing is provided by limited liability loans. In Section 2.5, we show that our main results are robust to allowing for refinancing with more complicated financial claims. We assume that if the entrepreneur is funded in the second period, the bank 1 It simplifies the analysis to assume that entrepreneurs cannot self-finance in the second-period. Alternatively, one can assume that the lender provides two units of capital at time zero and can seize the capital at the end of period 1 and get one unit back. We explore the consequences of relaxing this assumption at the end of Section 3.
cannot lay claim to any first-period revenues in excess of those initially paid back. Any residual first-period revenues are assumed to be consumed by the entrepreneur. In Section 2.5, we show that our qualitative findings continue to hold when entrepreneurs can use first-period revenues to partially finance the project in the second period.
Project revenues each period consist of the sum of a permanent and a transitory component.
The permanent component, ρ, which we refer to as project quality, takes on one of two values, L and H, L < H. The project is of high quality with probability π(H), 0 < π(H) < 1, and of low quality with probability π(L) = 1 − π(H). The transitory earnings components in periods t = 1, 2, t , are independently drawn from distributions G t (·). The associated density functions, g t (·), are assumed to be continuously differentiable and strictly positive on [0, ∞). Thus, project revenues in period t are given by
We assume that 0 < L < H < 1 so that revenues from a good project may not be sufficient to cover the required unit investment in each period.
At time t = 0, when the entrepreneur and the bank contract, project quality is unknown to both parties. This captures the observation that most start-ups are associated with few projects, so that they lack experience evaluating project quality. Ex post, however, specific experience leads entrepreneurs to be better informed than lenders. We therefore assume that at the beginning of period t = 1, after the contract has been signed, the entrepreneur privately observes both the quality of the project, ρ, and the first-period transitory earnings component, 1 .
Given this private information, the entrepreneur can then, unobserved by the bank, access another, more costly source of revenues. He can increase first-period revenues by θ ≥ 0 at a cost V (θ), where V (0) = 1, V (·) > 0. These assumptions imply that the first best level of θ is zero.
One interpretation of θ > 0 is that it represents excessive entrepreneurial effort. The interpretation we prefer is that θ > 0 reflects costly internal financing: funds raised by selling personal possessions at a high cost, or by selling resources prematurely at low prices, e.g., a fire sale of inventory.
While the entrepreneur observes the individual components of first-period revenues, the bank does not. For gross revenues in excess of the first-period loan repayment, the bank only observes those aggregate revenues, R 1 ,
that the entrepreneur chooses to reveal and cannot determine the portion of revenues actually generated by the project.
The key assumption is that the bank cannot determine whether the project generated the profits or whether the entrepreneur mixed in other revenues. Given observed revenues, R 1 , the bank makes inferences about project quality and determines whether to refinance the entrepreneur. Figure 1 illustrates the timing of events.
The following assumptions ensure that refinancing decisions are non-trivial:
A1: Given the optimal contract, investment in entrepreneurial activity ex ante has a strictly positive net present value.
A2
: Absent excessive effort, there exists a first-period project revenue level, H <R 1 < ∞ such that:
A3:
The greater are project earnings, the more likely the project is high quality: g t (·) is decreasing in and satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) (Milgrom, 1981) 2 .
We will subsequently provide assumptions on the primitives of our model that imply assumption A1. Assumption A2 implies that banks only want to refinance high quality projects 3 ,
Assumptions A2 and A3 together ensure that in the absence of excessive effort, it is optimal to refinance only those entrepreneurs who have sufficiently high first-period earnings.
2 A somewhat weaker condition that also delivers our results is given in Nachman et al. (1997) .
3 To see this, rewrite Equation (2) as Prob(ρ = H|R1)H + (1 − Prob(ρ = H|R1))L + E( 2) = 1, and use the fact that H > L.
Enduring Financing Relationships
We now analyze the case when the entrepreneur and bank can commit to an enduring financing relationship. That is, contracts prohibiting de novo, or third party, lending are legally enforceable.
We first show that all entrepreneurs with first-period revenues above a hurdle level are refinanced, and that the second-period interest rate that they receive is independent of their first-period revenues. Then, having determined the form of the equilibrium contract, we derive the entrepreneur's optimal effort level and then further characterize properties of the equilibrium.
We begin by defining a contract. Let r 1 represent the first-period gross interest rate and let r 2 (R 1 ) be the second-period gross interest rate for a refinanced project with observed first-period revenues, R 1 . Let δ(R 1 ) be an indicator function that equals one if a project is refinanced and zero otherwise. A contract between bank and entrepreneur is a triple, {r 1 , δ(R 1 ), r 2 (R 1 )}.
In equilibrium, banks offer contracts that maximize expected profits given that entrepreneurs will select their most preferred contracts from the set offered. Once first-period permanent and transitory earnings components are privately observed by the entrepreneurs, they choose effort to maximize expected utility given the contract they have chosen. Because banks and entrepreneurs are symmetrically informed when contracting, competition among banks implies that the equilibrium contract maximizes the ex ante expected utility of an entrepreneur subject to the constraints that banks earn zero expected profits and entrepreneurs make optimal effort decisions conditional on their private information.
The Form of the Equilibrium Contract
Here, we provide a characterization result that simplifies the derivation of the equilibrium. The equilibrium second-period interest rate does not decline with the revenue observed by the bank. This is demonstrated by showing that any contract which does not feature a cut-off rule for refinancing and a unique second-period interest rate can be improved upon. The key insight is that the only sources of inefficiency in equilibrium are the decision to refinance the project, and the first-period costly provision of revenues. A decreasing second-period interest rate function does not improve the equilibrium project selection, but leads to excessive effort. Thus, it cannot be optimal. 
Proposition 1
Proposition 1 says that the optimal second-period interest rate does not vary with first-period earnings for funded projects. Hence, the second-period interest rate typically will not generate zero expected period-two profits for the bank, conditional on all first-period revenue levels.
Our next assumption significantly simplifies the analysis without affecting the qualitative results.
A4:
In equilibrium, it is optimal to refinance a project only if the entrepreneur repays the initial
This places a bound on how high expected future profits are relative to current cash flows.
The Entrepreneur's Effort Decision
Having determined the form of the equilibrium contract, we now solve for the entrepreneur's optimal effort level. We start by presenting the entrepreneur's objective function. The entrepreneur's firstperiod payoff is
and the expected second period payoff is 0 if ρ + 1 + θ < C, so that they are not financed in the second period and E [max(ρ + 2 − r 2 , 0)] if ρ + 1 + θ ≥ C so that they are refinanced. Thus, the entrepreneur's decision problem is to choose θ to maximize:
where δ(ρ + 1 + θ) = 1 when ρ + 1 + θ ≥ C so that the project is refinanced, and equals zero if the project is not refinanced. Denote the solution to Equation (3) as θ(ρ, 1 ), the optimal amount by which the entrepreneur augments first-period project revenues.
Let I 1 (ρ) be the first-period transitory earnings shock that leaves an entrepreneur of type ρ indifferent between working hard enough to generate first-period revenue of C and be refinanced, and exerting no effort and hence not receiving second-period funding. We will refer to the entrepreneurs receiving these transitory shocks, I 1 (ρ), as the marginal entrepreneurs. To generate C requires working enough so that
Thus, I 1 (ρ) solves
where we have used assumption A4 that C > r 1 . From Equation (3), entrepreneurial profits are monotone is 1 , so that all entrepreneurs with first-period transitory shocks exceeding I (ρ) will generate first-period revenues of at least C. If r 2 = ∞, entrepreneurs receive zero profits from refinancing. Thus, when second-period interest rates are infinite, entrepreneurs have no incentive to expend effort. In this case, I 1 (ρ) = ∞ for both types of entrepreneur. The following Proposition summarizes entrepreneur's optimal effort.
Proposition 2 An entrepreneur with permanent earnings component, ρ, and transitory earnings,
1 , augments first-period earnings with costly revenues, θ(ρ, 1 ), where 1. For transitory earnings 1 < I 1 (ρ), the entrepreneur does not augment first-period revenues:
, the entrepreneur ensures that first-period revenues equal C:
If 1 ≥ C − ρ, the entrepreneur does not augment first-period revenues,
θ(ρ, 1 ) = 0.
If r 2 < ∞, so that entrepreneurs strictly prefer that projects continue, then the marginal
high-quality entrepreneurs expend more effort than the marginal low-quality entrepreneurs,
Furthermore, the expected effort of high-quality entrepreneurs is higher than the expected effort of low-quality entrepreneurs: If r 2 < ∞, so that second-period funding is profitable for entrepreneurs, high-quality entrepreneurs expect greater second-period revenues than low-quality entrepreneurs. Hence, highquality entrepreneurs are more willing to over-exert in the first-period to obtain refinancing. The result is that more high-quality entrepreneurs obtain second-period funding, improving the mix of refinanced projects. In Lemma 1 in the next section, we will provide a weak sufficient condition for r 2 < ∞ so that entrepreneurs expend effort in equilibrium.
The result that entrepreneurs, particularly those on the margin, have an incentive to over-exert contrasts sharply with the under-exertion prediction of most models of entrepreneurial finance which feature either limited liability loans or equity finance. There, because entrepreneurs, particularly those on the edge of bankruptcy, do not expect to receive all the benefits of their labor, they under-invest or under-exert. Here, the dynamic refinancing decision overturns that result. In the next section, we present further characterizations of the equilibrium.
The Equilibrium Contract
Competition amongst banks, and the symmetry of information at the contracting stage implies that in equilibrium, the bank chooses interest rates and a revenue hurdle that maximizes the entrepreneur's ex ante expected utility subject to the bank's break-even constraint:
The first term of the objective function is the first-period payoff of entrepreneurs who do not receive second-period funding; the second term is the expected payoff of those entrepreneurs who exert to obtain second-period funding; the third term is the expected payoff of those entrepreneurs who do not need to expend effort to obtain second-period funding. The left-hand side of (9) is the amount that the bank expects to lend; the first term is the first-period loan and the second term is the expected amount of refinancing. The right-hand-side of (9) is the revenues that the bank expects to receive from its loans; the first term is the expected first-period repayment and the second term is the expected repayments from refinancing.
Assumptions A1 -A3 and the condition that V (0) = 1 are sufficient to ensure that r 1 and C are characterized by interior solutions. A3 ensures that some, but not all, projects should be funded so that C is interior. We assume that the first-order conditions characterize the equilibrium and then identify conditions that ensure this, namely, that r 2 < ∞. We then present the equilibrium contract when r 2 = ∞, so that no effort is expended in equilibrium.
To simplify the exposition, we assume that entrepreneurs who receive transitory shocks I 1 (ρ) can repay their loans without expending effort. However, we can show that our results on credit rationing and subsidization of marginal entrepreneurs continue to hold when this assumption does not hold.
The first-order conditions to Equation (8) subject to Equation (9) are
and the break-even constraint for the bank, Equation (9). Here λ is the Lagrange-multiplier for the bank's break-even constraint and
is the bank's expected second-period profit from lending to an entrepreneur of type ρ when the second period interest rate is r 2 .
The Lagrange multiplier is the marginal cost of lending one unit of capital. From Equation (10), this marginal cost is one. Substituting λ = −1 into (11) and (12) then yields
These two equations and the bank's break-even constraint jointly determine the first-period interest rate, the funding cut-off level and the second period interest rate. The first term of (15) is the expected marginal cost of an increase in the cut-off level for refinancing, C; the second term is the expected marginal change in second-period bank profits from improving the quality of refinanced projects.
The solution to the equilibrium outcome has a separable structure. The cut-off level for funding, C, and optimal second-period interest rate, r 2 are given by the solution to equations (14), and (15).
Given r 2 and C, the first-period interest rate is obtained from the bank's break-even constraint, (9). In the next section, we show that credit rationing occurs in equilibrium, even though on average, the bank sets the second period interest rate to subsidize marginal entrepreneurs who are refinanced.
Credit Rationing and Bank Subsidies
An interesting property of the equilibrium is that it features credit rationing. By credit rationing, we mean that decreasing the hurdle rate would attract positive expected net present value projects.
It is also the case that the expected net present value of all projects with revenues that just meet the funding cut-off is strictly positive. Recall that the marginal entrepreneur of each type is indifferent between expending effort to meet the refinancing hurdle and not expending effort so that he is not refinanced. Even though the marginal entrepreneurs project have strictly positive expected net present value, the bank sets the second period interest rate to subsidize these entrepreneurs.
That is, the second period interest rate is set so that the marginal entrepreneur receives positive profits from refinancing, while the bank receives negative expected profits from refinancing the marginal entrepreneur. However, the bank does expect positive profits from refinancing projects with sufficiently high first-period revenues.
Proposition 3 The projects associated with the marginal entrepreneurs, those with transitory
shocks I 1 (ρ), have strictly positive expected NPV:
Here,
is the conditional probability that a marginal entrepreneur is of type ρ.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Suppose that the expected second-period NPV of the marginal entrepreneur's project is zero. Then by increasing the cut-off for funding slightly, the measure of agents expending effort to obtain refinancing is reduced. Because the expected NPV of the marginal entrepreneur's project is zero, no positive NPV projects are lost when the cut-off increases. Thus, the increase in the cut-off must increase entrepreneurial welfare, since effort is reduced while the expected NPV of refinanced projects does not change so that neither the first nor the second period interest rates need to change to satisfy the break-even constraint. Hence, the marginal entrepreneur's project must have a positive expected NPV; the equilibrium must feature credit rationing. A further implication of Proposition 3 is that the expected NPV is positive for all projects with first-period revenues equal to the funding standard, C:
The expected present value of all projects whose first-period output equals to hurdle level, C, is strictly positive:
Even though the marginal entrepreneur's project has a strictly positive net present value, the second period interest rate is set so that the expected profit for the bank from refinancing this entrepreneur is negative.
Proposition 4
The bank subsidizes the second-period projects of the marginal entrepreneurs:
Recall that the marginal entrepreneur of each type is the entrepreneur of that type who expends the most effort. On average, the bank subsidizes this entrepreneur in order to improve the sorting of projects. It does so since better second-period financing terms differentially encourage high quality entrepreneurs to seek funding. Note, however, that other projects also have first-period revenues of C: while on average, the bank subsidizes the marginal entrepreneur, the bank may expect positive second-period profits from refinancing all entrepreneurs who just meet the finding hurdle.
Combining Equation (18) with Equation (14) reveals that
The bank sets the second-period interest rate so that at the margin, a high quality entrepreneur is more sensitive to a change in the second period interest rate, r 2 than a low quality entrepreneur.
Intuitively, were (19) not true, then increasing r 2 would both improve the quality of refinanced projects and reduce the amount of excessive effort. There is a trade-off between reducing r 2 to improve the quality of funded projects and increasing the amount of excessive effort.
We now provide a weak sufficient condition for the second-period interest rate to be finite so that entrepreneurs expend effort in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 If
then in equilibrium, r 2 < ∞.
Condition (20) is satisfied by all bounded distributions. This condition ensures that a finite r 2 exists that solves Equation (19). Since high quality entrepreneurs benefit more from refinancing at a finite second period interest rate, this implies that more high quality entrepreneurs will expend effort than low quality entrepreneurs. Condition (20) ensures that this effect can be used to improve the expected quality of refinanced projects.
Equation (20) is a sufficient condition for the solution to be interior. The equilibrium may feature an interior solution even if (20) is violated. However, if (20) is violated it may also be that r 2 = ∞. In that event, the bank appropriates all second-period revenues and entrepreneurs have no incentive to work. One can interpret the situation where the second-period interest rate is infinite as a development deal between the bank and entrepreneur. The lender pays the entrepreneur an up-front fee to develop the project, which the lender subsequently runs whenever the project is sufficiently successful early on. In this case, Equation (2) implies that C =R 1 , implying that the bank refinances all positive expected NPV projects. Then, the first-period interest rate is set to satisfy the bank's break-even constraint. By A3, the MLRP assumption, the bank expects positive second-period profits so that to break even, it must subsidize entrepreneurs in the first-period.
We can now show what conditions are needed on the primitives of the model so that our assumption A1 that investment in entrepreneurial activity has strictly positive ex ante present value holds. A lower bound on the entrepreneur's ex ante expected payoff can be found by is setting r 2 = ∞ and C =R 1 , solving for the associated break-even first period interest rate and substituting it into the objective function, Equation (8). Since the entrepreneurs receive positive expected payoffs only when the first period interest rate is finite, assumption A1, that entrepreneurs have positive ex ante payoffs in equilibrium is satisfied ifr 1 < ∞, wherer 1 solves the bank's zero expected profits condition:
Discussion of Model Assumptions
Our results that excessive effort improves sorting, projects associated with the marginal entrepreneurs have positive expected NPV, and marginal entrepreneurs are subsidized flow from two sources: the persistence of entrepreneurial ability and limited liability financing contracts. Persistence implies that high quality entrepreneurs expect greater profits in the second period than low quality entrepreneurs. Limited liability implies that as long as the lender does not appropriate all secondperiod revenues, all entrepreneurs expect positive profits from refinancing. Together, persistence and limited liability imply that at an interior optimum, the refinancing hurdle is set so high-quality entrepreneurs are more sensitive to changes in second-period interest rates, improving the quality of refinanced projects. These key features of our model deliver our qualitative results. We now investigate how these results are robust to changes in other, less-critical, assumptions.
First, while we formally analyze only debt financing, the qualitative results carry over to other financing forms. Any contracts where entrepreneurs with high-quality projects have greater incentives to sort themselves out by expending effort generate the same qualitative results. This follows because with such contracts, entrepreneurs with good projects expect greater second-period profits from refinancing than do entrepreneurs with bad projects. For example, allowing the bank to refi-nance projects by holding an equity share to second-period revenues generates results quantitatively similar to those obtained when there is debt financing in both periods. Cornelli and Yosha (1997) show that in a model of stage financing where entrepreneurs have incentives to 'window dress' to receive continued financing, convertible debt can reduce these incentives. This would be true in our model. However, in our model, as long as the entrepreneur receives any share of equity stake in the refinanced firm and limited liability holds, then the equilibrium would feature costly internal finance, and good quality entrepreneurs would have more provide costly internal finance to be refinanced than low quality entrepreneurs.
We have assumed that entrepreneurs do not finance second-period projects themselves, no matter how high their first-period revenues are. Allowing entrepreneurs to use retained earnings from first-period revenues to self-finance the requisite second-period investment generally has no qualitative effect. One can show that if entrepreneurs can use retained earnings to self-finance then all refinanced entrepreneurs will contribute C − r 1 in finance. It is not optimal to demand less self-financing from entrepreneurs with greater first-period revenues, because it does not improve the quality of funded projects and distorts effort. If entrepreneurs can use retained earnings to self-finance then the quality of refinanced projects improves because it is less attractive for bad entrepreneurs to sink first-period earnings into the project. However, if any low-quality entrepreneurs choose to be refinanced, i.e. provided the expected second-period profits of low-quality entrepreneurs exceed C − r 1 , the qualitative findings do not change. The marginal funded project has a strictly positive NPV, and only marginal entrepreneurs expend effort.
If, instead, C −r 1 equals the expected second-period profits of a low-quality entrepreneurs, then in equilibrium, only good entrepreneurs are refinanced. The complete separation of entrepreneurial types in our model with self-financing stems from the fact that there are only two entrepreneurial types. In a richer model, with a continuum of types, complete separation would not occur, and again, in equilibrium, some "worse" entrepreneurs would be refinanced.
Last, if we allow good entrepreneurs to sever the contract after one period, good entrepreneurs with sufficiently high revenues might choose to quit the long-term contract and finance the second-period project completely from retained earnings. If the residual pool of entrepreneurs were bad enough, this might lead again, to a contractual breakdown in the second period. Again however, in a richer model with more types, the our qualitative results still hold. The very best entrepreneurs self-finance, and others continue to use the bank in the second period. Further, the funding cut-off level and second period interest rate are set so that the NPV of the marginal refinanced project is positive and and better entrepreneurs exert excessive effort.
Thus, our findings are robust to augmenting the contracting space with the size of refinancing loan. This is because the underlying rationale for credit rationing is not just to discourage entrepreneurs who are "too" risky. In our model, credit rationing does more than help sort risks (augmenting the contracting space improves sorting): it discourages entrepreneurs from expending effort to obtain refinancing. Indeed, suppose the contracting space could be augmented to allow a sure payment to entrepreneurs who meet the refinancing cut-off, but then agree to shut down.
If this payment is equal to the second-period profits from operation that bad entrepreneurs expect, then the bad entrepreneurs would take the offer and only good entrepreneurs would operate in the second period. However, credit would still be rationed in order to discourage excessive entrepreneurial effort in order to obtain future profits or payments.
With relationship banking, the optimal contract potentially features ex-post regret from the bank's perspective. Although the bank profits in the second period on projects with sufficiently high first period revenues, on average, it subsidizes marginal entrepreneurs. It may be that sufficiently low revenues the bank may have the incentive to pull the plug. Whether or not it does hinges on whether the bank expects to lose money at any first-period revenue level that exceeds the cutoff.
Reducing the level of the bank's commitment leaves our qualitative results unaffected. If the bank does not lose money on average even at revenue level C in the unconstrained problem (even though we know that it will lose money from the marginal project) then the results are unchanged. If the bank does lose money at some revenue levels that exceed the cutoff with complete commitment, and we add the constraint that the bank make positive profits in the second period for each revenue level above the cutoff, the qualitative results are unchanged. The cutoff with the additional constraint is higher, there is superior sorting, but the cost is that there is excessive credit rationing.
One might expect that the reason that the traditional entrepreneurial under-exertion result is overturned in our model because entrepreneurs know the required effort level to meet the funding cutoff and receive the full benefit of their effort. That is, one might not expect under-exertion because in equilibrium, those who expend any effort are sure to receive refinancing. In addition, because the optimal entrepreneurial effort level is zero, it is not possible to under-exert. We now detail how the qualitative predictions of our model are affected both when meeting the funding hurdle is uncertain and when under-exertion is possible.
Our results are robust to introducing another source of uncertainty in first-period revenues so that entrepreneurs may not be certain whether their effort will increase revenues by enough so that they will be refinanced. This revenue source smoothes out the relationship between effort and the transitory earnings shock given entrepreneur quality. The relationship is now continuous and hump-shaped: entrepreneurs who are either very likely or unlikely to make the cut-off for continued finance exert little effort, while those with intermediate earnings, whose likelihood of obtaining refinancing is largely dependent on their effort, exert substantial effort.
When the optimal level of entrepreneurial effort is positive, entrepreneurs who receive such low first-period revenues that it is not optimal to repay the loan, would exert no effort, as in Myers (1977) . Effort by other entrepreneurial types is otherwise unchanged: those entrepreneurs close to the margin put forth just enough excessive effort to obtain refinancing and those who would obtain continued funding with optimal effort exert optimally.
If the initial lender observes project revenues but outside lenders do not, and if the initial lender can make counter-offers to any entrepreneur who receives a second-period offer of outside funding, then no outside bank will lend: it would not be necessary to contractually prohibit de novo lending.
In such an instance, outside lenders would end up funding only those projects that the initial lender finds unprofitable -but then those projects must leave competing banks with negative expected profits so that they would not make competing second-period offers.
Finally, our results are also qualitatively unaffected if the lender cannot observe revenues in excess of r 1 , but rather can only observe whether or not the entrepreneur repaid the initial loan.
If only the first-period loan repayment and not revenues is observed by the lender then there is an additional constraint on the program determining the optimal contract: r 1 = C. Relative to when first-period revenues are observed, the optimal first-period interest rate, r c 1 , is increased to a level below the original cut-off level for refinancing, so that r 1 < r c 1 < C. That is, the firstperiod interest rate is increased and the cut-off for refinancing is reduced. We can incorporate the constraint r 1 = C into the programming problem with an extra Lagrange multiplier (so that the right-hand side of (10) is now equal to γ, and the right-hand side of (12) is equal to −γ).
The intuition underlying Proposition 3 continues to ensure that the marginal funded project has a strictly positive NPV. The effect of not being able to observe first-period revenues in excess of of the loan repayment on the second-period interest rate, r 2 , is ambiguous because a worse distribution of projects is funded when the lender is constrained by r 1 = C. The net effect depends on whether the increase in bank revenues in the first-period due to increased effort (C is reduced and the density of 1 is declining so more agents exert excess effort for any given interest rate, r 2 ) and the higher first-period interest rate, r 1 , outweighs the worse project selection effects.
Period-by-Period Lender Competition
In this section, we analyze the equilibrium when all potential lenders observe first-period revenues and de novo lending cannot be contractually prohibited so that an entrepreneur can obtain secondperiod funding from any bank. We show that all projects with positive NPV conditional on realized output are refinanced in the second period. However, all effort is unproductive; entrepreneurs are ex ante worse off than when de novo lending is prohibited.
We start by defining some notation. For a particular first-period revenue realization, R 1 , let −1 (R 1 | ρ) be the transitory earnings component such that the entrepreneur of type ρ optimally chooses to generate excessive effort that leads to revenue R 1 . We will show that assumption A3, the MLRP assumption, implies that −1 (R 1 | ρ) is a well-defined function. Let µ(R 1 ; ρ) be the conditional probability that the entrepreneur is of type ρ given revenues R 1 :
Finally, let r NC 1 be the first period interest rate and r NC 2 (R 1 ) the second period interest rate as a function of first period revenues observed by the lenders.
We now present the form of the equilibrium with short-term lending. Period-by-period competition among lenders leads them to extend loans with interest rates that yield them zero-expected profits conditional on their information. In the first-period, lenders have no information, and competition among lenders in the second-period demands that they expect zero profits conditional on first-period revenues, R 1 .
Proposition 5
The following describes the equilibrium when lenders compete period-by-period.
The competitive first-period interest rate is given by the solution to
1 = ρ π(ρ) ρ−r NC 1 0 (ρ + 1 )G 1 (d 1 ) + ∞ ρ−r NC 1 r NC 1 G 1 (d 1 ) .(22)
Provided that first-period revenues are sufficient for the entrepreneur to receive second-period funding, the second-period interest-rate for an entrepreneur with first-period revenues R is
given by r NC 2 (R 1 ), where r NC 2 (R 1 ) solves
The NPV of the marginal refinanced entrepreneur is zero. That is, all entrepreneurs with
revenues in excess ofR 1 are refinanced, whereR 1 satisfies Equation (2) in assumption A2. 
For
Recall that if entrepreneur and lender could establish an enduring relationship, the marginal funded project had a strictly positive NPV in order to discourage marginal entrepreneurs from tapping excessively the alternative revenue source. When competition is period-by-period, however, if a project has a positive net present value conditional on its first-period revenues then it is funded.
Since the lender claims all revenues from the marginal funded project with first-period revenues, R 1 , there is no distortion of effort for the marginal funded project from a static perspective. From an efficiency standpoint, however, efficient static effort leads to insufficient sorting of funded projects.
Entrepreneurs would be better off ex ante if high quality entrepreneurs with transitory earnings components marginally less thanR 1 − H were to augment first-period project revenues with costly funds in order to obtain second-period funding. The cost of marginally tapping these alternative funds is zero, but the gain to funding a good entrepreneur in the second-period is strictly positive.
For transitory earnings realizations such that the entrepreneur is refinanced, i.e. for 1 >R 1 −ρ, the type ρ entrepreneur chooses θ to solve
Denote the optimal θ by θ NC (ρ, 1 ). In the differentiable case, the first order condition is given by
where the second line follows because dR 1 dθ = 1 and the third line follows because the second period interest rate is monotonically decreasing in first-period revenues. Since V (·) > 0, Equation (25) implies that θ NC > 0. Entrepreneurs augment first-period project revenues in order to obtain better second-period financing. Since only those projects conditional on no effort are funded in equilibrium, the effort does not improve the average quality of refinanced projects.
We can now show that −1 (R 1 | ρ) is well-defined. Since interest rates are decreasing in first-period revenues by the MLRP condition, first-period revenues optimally generated by the entrepreneurs are strictly increasing in the first-period transitory shock. Thus, R 1 is invertible in 1 for a given permanent shock and so −1 (R 1 | ρ) is well-defined.
Having described the equilibrium under period-by-period competition, in the next section we will now compare this equilibrium to the outcomes under commitment.
Comparisons
We now compare the equilibria with and without de novo lending. We show that if the firstperiod interest rate is higher when enduring financing relationships can be formed, then if lenders compete period-by-period there is less bankruptcy, lower initial interest rates, and all positive expected NPV projects are funded. Despite all of these apparently optimal benchmark qualities, period-by-period competition between lenders is sub-optimal. This is because the financing terms when entrepreneurs and lenders can establish enduring relationships are set so that banks need not break even in expectation each period. Underlying this is the fact that if enduring relationships can be formed, excessive entrepreneurial effort is productive, while if enduring relationships cannot be formed, excessive effort is wasteful. In particular, enduring relationships permit superior sorting of entrepreneurial types.
Costly effort is productive only when the lender and entrepreneur can form an enduring relationship.
Proposition 6 When lender and entrepreneur cannot form an enduring relationship, then the effort of the funded agents is inefficient. Funded agents would be better off if they could commit to
If lender and entrepreneur can form an enduring relationship, then effort of the marginal funded agents generates a better distribution of funded projects. Entrepreneurs are better off than if they
committed to θ(ρ, 1 ) = 0.
With competition amongst lenders, is dissipative for entrepreneurs to augment project revenues.
Increasing observed first-period revenues does not affect the selection of projects, only the division of second-period rents between lender and entrepreneur. In contrast, when lenders and entrepreneurs can establish enduring relationships, since good entrepreneurs gain more from refinancing than bad entrepreneurs, they are more willing to augment first-period project revenues, improving the quality of projects that is refinanced. If there are enduring financing relationships and entrepreneurs do not augment their cash flows, then, the proportion of marginal funded projects that are of high quality would be given by
. But, when lender and entrepreneur can form an enduring relationship, the proportion of funded projects that are of high quality is even greater because high-quality entrepreneurs are more willing than low-quality entrepreneurs to expend resources in order to obtain refinancing at an attractive interest rate.
While it is the case that in enduring relationships, the marginal funded project has a strictly positive NPV, it does not follow that fewer projects are funded than if banks compete periodby-period, even though the marginal funded project in the latter case has a zero NPV. This is because the second-period interest rate set for the marginal funded project is lower when lender and entrepreneur form an enduring relationship than when banks compete period-by-period. The lower interest rate differentially encourages good entrepreneurs to expend resources to obtain funding, 
Empirical Implications
Here, we present some of the empirical implications of our model. We first present implications when entrepreneurs and banks can commit to long-term relationships then discuss the implications for the case of period-by-period competition.
If de novo lending is prohibited, the equilibrium lending contract is similar to a loan commitment: all entrepreneur's with first period revenues exceeding the cut-off level receive funding at a predetermined interest rate, independent of first period revenues. Duca and VanHoose (1990) note that over 80% of all commercial lending features loan commitments. If we interpret θ as costly internal financing, then with relationship banking, better entrepreneurs use more internal financing.
Further, the cut-off for refinancing is set so that the expected net present value of firms that meet the revenue hurdle is strictly positive.
Our results are also relevant to the question of who receives the benefits of relationship banking, the borrower or the lender. Of course, in our model, the equilibrium is ex ante optimal for the borrowers. However, ex poste borrowers with different permanent and transitory shocks receive different payoffs. In the equilibrium where the second period interest rate is finite, the second period interest rate is set so that the marginal entrepreneurs are subsidized. Thus, entrepreneurs with low transitory shocks who are refinanced receive the benefits of relationship lending. Since the interest rate for refinanced projects is independent of first period revenues, firms with high first period revenues subsidize the bank. Thus, in our model, the benefits of relationship lending accrue to both the lender and the borrower, depending on the first period cash flows of the borrower.
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) present empirical evidence that high quality Japanese firms reduced borrowing from their banks when the domestic bond markets were liberalized. This is consistent with the relationship banking equilibrium in our model. Recall that with long-term relationships, the second period interest rate for refinanced firms is independent of the first period revenues. Thus, in our model, high-quality firms have an incentive to use other financing sources if available, consistent with the evidence from Japan.
When borrowers and lenders cannot commit to a long-term relationship, all entrepreneurs whose projects have positive NPV conditional on no effort are financed. The second interest rate is decreasing in first period revenue, so that projects with higher first period revenues are refinanced at better interest rates. Entrepreneurs whose projects are refinanced exert effort to receive better refinancing terms. Peterson and Rajan (1995) compare the availability of credit and dynamic pattern of interest rates across markets with different levels of banking competition. They find that in more con-centrated markets, initial interest rates are lower than in less concentrated markets, and that the interest rate tend to decrease at a lower rate in more concentrated markets. This is consistent with the implications of our model. With relationship banking, our model predicts that initial interest rates are typically lower, and that there is dynamic subsidization of interest rates across periods, while with period-by-period competition, interest rates must be set so that the banks break-even each period. Peterson and Rajan (1995) also find evidence that more young firms seems to be credit rationed in less concentrated markets. In our model, there is no credit rationing in the first period, since all firms are financed in the first period. Our model predicts that older firms are more likely to face credit rationing under relationship banking than with period-by-period competition.
Data similar to that used by Peterson and Rajan (1995) would be useful to check additional implications of our model. One could check to see if there is evidence that interest rates are less responsive to initial cash flows of the firms in more concentrated markets. Further, if a reasonable proxy for firm quality can be found, then our model predicts that higher quality firms in more concentrated markets are likely to use higher levels of costly internal financing. Our model also predicts that more high quality firms are refinanced in concentrated markets than with period-byperiod competition.
Conclusion
This paper explores how the nature of competition and criteria for continued financing affect entrepreneurial activity when both project quality and sources of cash flow such as effort or costly sales are private information. We determine when entrepreneurs will "throw good money after bad," i.e. when they will access sources of financing with high opportunity costs, such as sale of personal goods or sale of firm resources at prices below market value, or exert excessive effort, to try to keep their ventures afloat. The results in the paper also apply to the internal capital budgeting process in a decentralized firm. There, we interpret the entrepreneurs as division managers, and the lenders as the central budgeting authority.
When borrower and lender can establish enduring financing relationships, the marginal un-funded project has a strictly positive expected NPV, and marginal entrepreneurs augment revenues with more costly funds in order to convince lenders to refinance them. In contrast, with periodby-period competition between lenders, the marginal funded project has a zero expected NPV, equilibrium initial interest and bankruptcy rates may be lower, and better projects receive better refinancing terms.
A policy maker making these observations might mistakenly conclude that period-by-period competition should be fostered. The policy maker might point to the difference in the NPV of the marginal funded project and claim that commercial banks are failing to support the economy and provide jobs. Yet, this paper argues that when lender and entrepreneur can form enduring relationships, it is precisely such marginal firms to whom it is optimal to deny credit in order to discourage excessive waste of resources by firms trying to obtain refinancing.
The source for the policy maker's confusion is that with enduring financing relationships, the excessive efforts of entrepreneurs help lenders sort out good entrepreneurs from bad, and leads to the financing of more good entrepreneurs. In contrast, with period-by-period competition between lenders, entrepreneurs supplement revenues with more costly funds only to obtain better financing terms. But this does not affect the pool of funded projects, and hence is wasteful. 
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: If the project is funded in the second-period, period-two revenues, R 2 , are unaffected by the second-period interest rate, r 2 (R 1 ). The only reason to augment first-period revenues is to obtain refinancing so, of course, the entrepreneur will not augment second-period revenues with costly funds. Therefore, the only equilibrium sources of inefficiency are the decision to fund the second-period project, and the first-period costly provision of revenues.
Since entrepreneurs can conceal revenues, we can restrict attention to second-period interest rate functions, r 2 (R 1 ), that are weakly monotone decreasing in first-period revenues. This follows because if the entrepreneur generated revenues R 1 > R 1 , but r 2 (R 1 ) > r 2 (R 1 ), the entrepreneur need only reveal R 1 . Similarly, the ability to conceal revenues implies that we can focus on refinancing agreements that fund all projects with revenues above a cutoff level, C. We now show that it is not optimal to have r 2 (R 1 ) strictly decreasing on any interval.
Let R * (ρ, 1 ; r 1 , r 2 (·)) denote the optimal level of total first-period revenues for a type ρ entrepreneur with transitory earnings, 1 , conditional on the contract. Observe that R * (ρ, 1 ; r 1 , r 2 (·)) is weakly increasing in 1 , since r 2 (·) is weakly decreasing.
Let z ρ be the least revenue level such that entrepreneur type ρ generates revenues R 1 = z ρ in equilibrium and is refinanced. Suppose that r 2 (R 1 ) is declining on some interval, [a, b] 
Hence, θ(ρ, 1 ) > 0 for a set of (ρ, 1 ), ρ+ 1 > a of positive measure. (e.g. if r 2 (R 1 ) is differentiable,
Since the entrepreneur generating revenues z H under the original contract still does so under the new contract, then by the monotonicity of R * (·), any good entrepreneur who generates revenues greater than z H does so under the new contract. Further, the incentive to over-work is reduced: entrepreneurs with revenues ρ + 1 > a now choose θ = 0: only those entrepreneurs with total revenues at a under the new contract set θ > 0. The level of exertion of good entrepreneurs who generate revenues a under the old contract is unaffected by the contract change. Thus, the measure of good entrepreneurs funded is unchanged and the level of excessive effort is reduced by the change in contract terms.
The change in contract can only reduce the number of low quality entrepreneurs refinanced since refinancing is less profitable under the new contract. Further, any bad entrepreneurs who might have over-worked to get an interest rate less than r 2 (a) cease to do so.
If, in the original contract, z L ≥ z H , the proof is complete, because the revised contract satisfies z L = z H . Suppose that in the original contract z L < z H . Following the same logic as above, setting
H ) must be welfare improving since it reduces excessive effort without affecting the mix of funded projects. But then note that increasing the cut-off for funding past z L to z H increases welfare because it induces a one-for-one increase in the marginal low quality entrepreneur, reducing excessive effort as well as the number of low quality entrepreneurs who are refinanced.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The solution follows from the entrepreneur's optimization problem: 
From the definition of I 1 (ρ, r 2 ) from Equation ( 
where the second line follows from Equation (4). Substituting Equation (A3) into Equation (A2) yields
Using the fundamental theorem of calculus,
where the second line follows from substituting θ(·) in terms of 1 and changing the variable of integration, and last line follows because g 1 (·) is monotonically decreasing in 1 . Substituting (A5) into (A4) then gives the result.
Proof of Corollary 1:
This follows from the MLRP condition on 1 and the monotonicity of effort in terms of 1 .
Proof of Proposition 4:
The result follows from Equation ( infinite interest rate is the associated break-even condition if no entrepreneurs exert effort to achieve this revenue level. The expected quality of projects with revenues in excess ofR 1 strictly exceeds that of a project with revenuesR 1 , which strictly exceeds the expected quality of projects with revenues less thanR 1 . If they receive all second-period funds, lenders break even on projects with first-period revenuesR 1 , make money from those with greater revenues, and lose money on those with lower revenues. Competition then implies that lenders will fund projects with revenues in excess ofR 1 , fund the marginal zero NPV project with first-period revenuesR 1 , claiming all second-period revenues from the marginal project with an infinite interest rate, and not fund projects with lower revenues. Given this funding rule, the marginal funded entrepreneur does not over-exert, so that the probability the entrepreneur is good is given by Equation (24).
4. Suppose that r 2 (·) is constant over some interval [a, b] . Then entrepreneurs with project revenues R 1 ∈ [a, b] will all exert the same effort to obtain funding. But then since the distribution of idiosyncratic revenues, G 1 , satisfies the MLRP, higher first-period revenues are associated with better quality projects so that competition between lenders on these higher-revenue projects would drive interest rates down, a contradiction.
5 This follows from the first order condition for the entrepreneurs optimization problem.
Proof of Proposition 6:
The first claim is immediate: without an enduring relationship, the entrepreneur's effort does not affect the set of funded projects, but the costly effort distortions are incurred.
When de novo lending is prohibited, the entrepreneur's effort must be socially beneficial on the margin, or else increasing r 2 by an arbitrarily large amount and decreasing r 1 so as to satisfy the bank's individual rationality constraint at equality would eliminate the profitability of refinancing and hence all signal jamming, making entrepreneurs better off, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 7:
When banks compete period-by-period, then measure 1 − G 1 (R 1 − H) of good entrepreneurs are funded because banks extract all revenues from the marginal funded project. Suppose that when lender and entrepreneur can form an enduring relationship, C and r 2 are set so high that (H) >R 1 − H. But then by reducing C toR 1 and setting r 2 = ∞, expected second-period net output is increased and excess effort is eliminated, so the original contract could not have been optimal. This contract is, in turn, dominated by one with a lower r 2 , a contradiction.
